Diverting the Radicalization Track

"Diverting the Radicalization Track" by Jared Cohen. Policy Review, April/May, 2009.

Cohen's basic message is simple: we shouldn't teach democracy; we should simply create forums for information exchange, expression, and free choice. While this idea sounds nice, it suffers from the same problem that plagues so many modern "analysts," reporters, and politicians. Democracy != voting. There's more to it than that. The things Cohen advocates (freedom of information, expression, association) are all fundamental tenets of democracy. You don't have a democracy without them.

While Cohen is correct that it's more important to create outlets for expression and idea exchange than to re-indoctrinate Muslim youth susceptible to the pull of extremist thought, he should be even broader. While I love Howcast.com (and I know one of the guys behind it), Howcast isn't the solution to violent global extremism. A comprehensive plan needs to be put in place to address the fundamental pillars that undergird democracy: the rule of law, freedom of information, freedom of association, and the protection of minority rights. The free press, free association, and information freedom, in general, can certainly be addressed, in part, over the internet.

Globalization, American Power, and International Security

"Globalization, American Power, and International Security" by Jonathan Kirshner

This article starts out by asking, "What are the consequences of globalization for international conflict in general and American power in particular?" Kirshner basically makes three arguments:
1) globalization weakens sovereignty
2) globalization changes the relative power of states because it affects them variably
3) The US is identified with the process of globalization, and people resist the US, at times, when frustrated with globalization itself.

The article is less a new argument (just about everything in it is unoriginal) than a simple survey of topics around globalization. It discusses security, global finance, and the media, for example. The most interesting point in the article is the implication for a changing realpolitik in which countries will not actually oppose the expansion of US power under globalization, but rather that they will simply try to moderate its pace and will perhaps coalesce into friendly blocs to amplify their influence on the direction and speed of globalization (or their influence on US policy).

What Has Moscow Done? Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Relations

"What Has Moscow Done? Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Relations" by Stephen Sestanovich (Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2008).

This article starts out by examining the prototypical "realist" response to the war in Georgia. That prototypical response is, essentially, to re-trench, ignoring many of the soft issues on which the US traditionally drubs Moscow and instead to focus on the key strategic issues which we can actually affect in the short run, such as preventing Iranian progress toward nuclear weapons. The US should stop talking about democracy, worrying about minor trade issues, or promoting human rights causes in the Eastern bloc, for example, and should strike a grand bargain with Russia. As Sestanovich points out, this kind of thinking is a mainstay of amature foreign policy thinking, and is rarely realistic. There are few, if any, grand bargains ever struck, and fewer still that hold.

Sestanovich argues, among other things, that the US genuinely miscalculated Russia's reactions to missile defense systems. No one expected the Russians to happily accept such programs, but perhaps their reaction against the missile defense systems was more than mere rhetoric. Perhaps, we, because we genuinely didn't intend the missile defenses as a tool to use to neutralize Russian power, were too quick to assume that the Russians wouldn't interpret it that way. Perhaps they took the implications, for themselves, of such defensive systems, more seriously than we meant them to.

He also argues that democracy must be "de-Americanized" as a brand. While I don't entirely agree with this, I do think that he alludes to a deeper point. Democracy needs to be better defined. Democracy is not simply "having votes" or "being like America." A real and useful definition of democracy would have to include reference to the rule of law, freedom of expression, enforceability of private agreements, protection of the rights of minorities, and access to the press. It is too easy now for foreign leaders to synonymize "democracy" and "American influence." This plays into their hands.

Finally, it is clear that the advance of Western agendas and the enlargement of the Western sphere of influence to include places such as the Ukraine and Georgia has reached a limit. Russia, weaker than it once was, is still powerful and influential, especially in Central Asia. The success of Western-style reforms and European integration has now run headlong into the still significant influence of Soviet tanks. A new equilibrium is being tested.

Getting Your Quarks in a Row

"Getting Your Quarks in a Row" by Brian Hayes. American Scientist, November-December, 2008.

This article deals with the challenges of using QCD (quantum chromodynamics) instead of QED (quantum electrodynamics). In a nutshell, QED is about understanding the interactions between quarks as interactions along axes of "charge" (I use the term charge here loosely, metaphorically, and not altogether correctly). QCD is a way of understanding quantum behavior in which the mechanism by which quarks interact is through the emission of various photons of different wavelengths.

QED has been more useful for making predictions in the past, due in part to the fact that it's easier to handle mathemetically. Basically, the Feynman sum-over-paths method (a way of "averaging" all the different possible states of the subatomic particles to determine where they are "likely" to be) works naturally for QED because the infinitely long series it produces converge, and so can be treated like perturbation models. QCD is more problematic, because the series it creates do not converge and are made more complex by the fact that gluons can "emit" other gluons, not just photons.

Lattice computing methods are used to calculate these things. The lattics is typically 4D (4th dimension is time). Every conceivable path via which things can "move" (even just in time) is mapped out on a big grid, and the paths are "summed." As the size of the grid squares over which the paths are described shrinks to 0, the lattice-based calculations should be useful predictions. However, the computing power for these models is still massive (and higher for QCD than for QED).

New techniques in QCD as well as new computing power are starting to make the QCD predictive models more feasible. These methods and computing systems will be more useful once the new Large Hadron Collider is available for experimentation.

The Second Sex

"The Second Sex" by Sally Scholz. Philosophy Now, Issue 69.

This article was basically a review of The Second Sex by Simone de Beauvoir. The most interesting part of the article was this one...

Women fundamentally see themselves as "other" and thereby are complicit in their own oppression by society (this is all from de Beauvoir). The examples given in the book of women who play the role of "other" most clearly are three:
1) Prostitute - She is the absolute other, but also is the exploiter. She exploits men for money and recognition of her "otherness."
2) Narcissist - She is also unable to be a subject; unable to freely pursue projects and goals herself. She turns instead to her otherness, and becomes her own object. She spends her time improving the object: herself.
3) Mystic - The mystic loses herself in God. She seems to be possessed, rather than to feel oppressed in her freedom.

Essentially, for women to achieve freedom, they must break out of the "woman as other" paradigm. De Beauvoir ridiculously thinks this requires that they embrace socialism, but it does not. However, women do face the constant struggle to identify themselves as actors, instead of falling into the narcisisst, prostitute, or mystic roles in which they can view themselves only as they are viewed by others.

The Merits of the Milesians

"The Merits of the Milesians" by Chad Trainer. Philosophy Now, Issue 69.

The Milesians were Mycenaean Greeks from Miletus (in SW Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey)). At Miletus they had a rich trading and manufacturing colony. Three famous pre-Socratic philosophers stationed themselves at Miletus. They were largely responsible for the "non-religious" or "non-mythical" origins of classical Greek philosophy.

The three were:
Thales - Thales described a world made from water/liquid. He believed that moisture was the essence of life.
Anixamander - Anaximander believed the essential material of the world was infinite, boundless, and intermediate. He thought it had no definite physical qualities of its own, and that it just acted as a medium for organizing matter.
Anaximenes - Anaximenes was the third in the chain of teacher/students, following Thales and Anixamander. He believed that "air" was the most fundamental substance. He was trained in geometry and applied a more rigorous, mathematical approach to his work than did his teachers.

Anaximenes had perhaps the first theory of the origin of the world without supernatural influence.

As Cyrus conquered Lydia in 547-546 BC, the capitol of Greek thought moved west to Southern Italy and the Mediterranean islands.

These guys were the first materialist philosophers, pre-dating the "4 elements" natural philosophy that persisted until the middle ages. However, it isn't necessarily right to call them materialists, because in their time, there was little notion of the mind/soul to contrast with the material interpretation of the world. Later materialists were rejecting the mind/soul primacy. These three simply hadn't thought of it, yet.

The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis

"The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis" by Charles King (Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2008).

This article lays out a line of thinking and suggests some conclusions, without necessarily advocating strongly for them or supporting the conclusions very well. Basically, the article says:

This is the lowest point in US-Russia relations since the Cold War. It asks the question, "Is the recent war in Georgia a throwback to Brezhnev crushing the demonstrations of the Prague Spring?" The article also touches on the consistency of the US response to independence movements around the world.

Russia has been involved in territorial struggles over the last two decades in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Chechnya. Russia also involved itself in the Civil War in Tajikistan. The Russian military has operated in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria since the early 90's. In that sense, the events in Georgia were not really new or unique.

However, there were certain departures from old patterns. Specifically:

1) The US and Europe engaged this issue much more directly than they did some of the other, aforementioned Russian interventions;

2) The Russian response, too, was different. "[This time was] an attempt to bypass established channels of conflict resolution and unilaterally change the boundaries of another UN member state."

Russia also broadened the conflict to "punish" Georgia.

But, Russia is likely to have a hard time sustaining the position it has carved out for itself. Only Moscow, Managua, and Minsk recognize independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Recognizing these countries' independence sets a dangerous precedent for Russia. It will drive some Asian countries toward NATO, and strengthen secession claims and cries from others.

There is a certain absurdity to micro-statehood (the areas in dispute in Georgia have only 200,000 inhabitants, combined). Kosovo, however, had a similarly small population. The intervention by NATO in Kosovo, though, while far more violent, enjoyed much wider support than the Russian participation in Georgia.

Finally, the article points out that this is not the beginning of a new cold war. There are ideological differences, as well as strategic ones, but the reason this is not a new cold war is simple - this time it's not a zero sum game. The domino theory, MAD, and Star Wars were all ideas based on the zero-sum nature of the conflict. In today's world, both Russia and the US have incentives to make their own systems attractive to third party countries and palateable to the rest of the world. However, they will both enjoy active influence in Georgian politics. The ways this influence will be achieved and the levels of influence will differ, but they will occur concurrently and sometimes even harmoniously. Overall, this is a far better paradigm, because in a zero-sum game, conflict is almost inevitable. In a non-zero sum game, conflict can cost both sides more than it gains them, even as they compete.