The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis

"The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis" by Charles King (Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2008).

This article lays out a line of thinking and suggests some conclusions, without necessarily advocating strongly for them or supporting the conclusions very well. Basically, the article says:

This is the lowest point in US-Russia relations since the Cold War. It asks the question, "Is the recent war in Georgia a throwback to Brezhnev crushing the demonstrations of the Prague Spring?" The article also touches on the consistency of the US response to independence movements around the world.

Russia has been involved in territorial struggles over the last two decades in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Chechnya. Russia also involved itself in the Civil War in Tajikistan. The Russian military has operated in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria since the early 90's. In that sense, the events in Georgia were not really new or unique.

However, there were certain departures from old patterns. Specifically:

1) The US and Europe engaged this issue much more directly than they did some of the other, aforementioned Russian interventions;

2) The Russian response, too, was different. "[This time was] an attempt to bypass established channels of conflict resolution and unilaterally change the boundaries of another UN member state."

Russia also broadened the conflict to "punish" Georgia.

But, Russia is likely to have a hard time sustaining the position it has carved out for itself. Only Moscow, Managua, and Minsk recognize independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Recognizing these countries' independence sets a dangerous precedent for Russia. It will drive some Asian countries toward NATO, and strengthen secession claims and cries from others.

There is a certain absurdity to micro-statehood (the areas in dispute in Georgia have only 200,000 inhabitants, combined). Kosovo, however, had a similarly small population. The intervention by NATO in Kosovo, though, while far more violent, enjoyed much wider support than the Russian participation in Georgia.

Finally, the article points out that this is not the beginning of a new cold war. There are ideological differences, as well as strategic ones, but the reason this is not a new cold war is simple - this time it's not a zero sum game. The domino theory, MAD, and Star Wars were all ideas based on the zero-sum nature of the conflict. In today's world, both Russia and the US have incentives to make their own systems attractive to third party countries and palateable to the rest of the world. However, they will both enjoy active influence in Georgian politics. The ways this influence will be achieved and the levels of influence will differ, but they will occur concurrently and sometimes even harmoniously. Overall, this is a far better paradigm, because in a zero-sum game, conflict is almost inevitable. In a non-zero sum game, conflict can cost both sides more than it gains them, even as they compete.